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INTRODUCTION

Consistency plays a central role in a fair criminal justice system. A
system that does not treat similarly situated people alike cannot be
squared with norms of justice or fairness in any society. Arbitraryjustice is an oxymoron. Consistency becomes more important as the severity of a penalty increases. Randomly assigned monetary fines are
bad enough, but arbitrariness in the administration of the death pent
tt
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alty is intolerable. Random executions are unlikely to deter crime, do
not further retributive goals, and are simply immoral.
Although the fear of executing an innocent defendant underlies
much of the contemporary opposition to capital punishment, the perception that the death penalty is arbitrarily imposed also motivates
opposition. Mistakes in the administration of criminaljustice are inevitable (and may be unacceptable in the case of the ultimate penalty),
but systematically arbitrary executions are completely intolerable. So
strong are the fears of arbitrary executions that they provided the primary justification for the Supreme Court's temporary moratorium on
executions in the mid-1970s. Arbitrary inflictions of the death penalty
are inconsistent with constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment and constitutional requirements of due process.
Only when state legislatures provided assurance that juries were given
adequate guidance to safeguard against arbitrariness did the Supreme
2
Court allow resumption of the death penalty in the United States.
Whether states in fact created or implemented jury instructions
that truly prevent arbitrariness in the administration of the death penalty is a matter of much debate. Numerous studies have presented
evidence suggesting that illegitimate factors such as race and jury misunderstanding continue to play a role in capital sentencing determinations.3 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has maintained that
guided jury instructions adequately protect against such sources of
4
arbitrariness.
In effect, the Supreme Court has adopted a simplistic model of
decision making in capital cases. 5 That is, the Court believes that each
capital case presents some stable, underlying degree of deathworthiness and that trial courts must accurately measure this trait. Under
this model, the decision that a juror faces in determining whether a
capital conviction warrants a death sentence is conceptually similar to
any binary decision. To make such a decision, jurors must assess the
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 274 (1972) (Brennan,J., concurring) (" [T]he
State must not arbitrarily inflict a severe punishment.").
2 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or
capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance.").
3
See, e.g., DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTI & CHARLFS A. PULASKI, JR., EQUAL
JusTiCE AND TIE DEATH PENAI'Y: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 154 tbl.32, 155-57,

184-88 (1990) (presenting evidence that race influences post-Furman death penalty cases);
Theodore Eisenherg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confsion:.Juror Instructions in Capital Cases,
79 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4-12 (1993) (presenting evidence that jurors in capital cases do not
understand jury instructions).
4 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 302-04 (1987).
5 See id. at 305 ("[T]he State must establish rational criteria that narrow the decisionmaker's judgment as to whether the circumstances of a particular defendant's case
meet the threshold.").
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degree to which the defendant deserves such a sentence and then determine whether this degree crosses some threshold level. The first
task is specific to each defendant and essentially requires some kind of
scaling of the case for imposition of the death penalty on this defendant. The second task is then to compare that measurement with
some absolute value to determine whether the defendant's conduct
crosses a threshold that would merit the death penalty. To be consistent, this threshold should remain constant across defendants. The
task in a capital case is surprisingly analogous to determining whether
to purchase a used car. People must assess the merits of the car and
then determine whether the merits are sufficiently high that they are
worth the price being asked. In effect, the decision requires two cognitive tasks: measurement followed by comparison with some absolute
standard.
Both of a juror's tasks in a capital case, measurement and comparison, are potential sources of arbitrariness. In the first task, jurors
might be influenced by irrelevant or inappropriate factors in assessing
the defendant's deathworthiness. Jurors might, for example, assess a
defendant's conduct more harshly if the defendant is an African
American than if the defendant is Caucasian. Similarly, irrelevant factors might influence where jurors draw the line between life and
death. So long as jurors are consistent in their assessment of the defendant's conduct, however, and use the same threshold for the death
penalty in all cases, the state can administer the death penalty consistently. The Supreme Court's faith that proper instructions will weed
out inappropriate considerations in these two tasks underlies both its
6
jurisprudence and its continued defense of the death penalty.
I
CONSISTENCY, LEGAL JUDGMENT, AND

PUNISHMENT DECISIONS

A.

Consistency in Judgment and Choice

Research in the cognitive psychology ofjudgment and choice suggests that consistency in binary choices is not the norm in human
judgment. Several decades of research on human judgment and
choice indicate that human judgment is profoundly sensitive to context. 7 This sensitivity makes choices erratic. From judgments concerning the purchase of consumer products to assessments of the
6
See, e.g., Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362 (1988) (citing cases) ("Since
Furman, our cases have insisted that the channeling and limiting of the sentencer's discretion in imposing the death penalty is a fundamental constitutional requirement for sufficiently minimizing the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." (citations omitted)).
7
SeeJeffreyJ. Rachlinski, The Uneasy Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2003).
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value of environmental amenities, psychologists have been able to
demonstrate profound inconsistencies in choice. 8 These inconsistencies appear to arise because people construct preferences to suit
choices. 9 People do not simply measure the unchanging features of
an option and compare the results to some threshold. Thus, the
model that the Supreme Court adopted for capital decision making
does not track how people make choices.
The principal evidence that human choice is inconsistent and
contextual is the demonstration of contrast effects in choice. For example, when making choices about consumer goods that vary across
multiple dimensions, people place more weight on dimensions that
they can evaluate clearly.' 0 In one study of this phenomenon, researchers presented subjects with evaluations of two music dictionaries.'' Dictionary A contained 20,000 entries but had a torn cover;
dictionary B had 10,000 entries and was completely intact. The first
group of subjects was presented with either dictionary A or B, but not
both. When asked to determine how much they would be willing to
pay for the dictionaries, subjects tended to state a lower amount for A
than for B. When given a choice between the two dictionaries, however, subjects preferred A over B. Although people do not have a
good sense of the relationship a torn cover should have with price,
they clearly understand that more entries make for a better dictionary.
Thus, when offered their choice of dictionaries, the number of words
drives choice. Such a strategy might be normatively defensible, except
that it can lead to reversals in judgment. 12 Researchers have identified this kind of contrast effect using a range of stimuli-from consumer products to job applicants.' 3' The independent weight people
attach to dimensions that can easily be evaluated creates inconsistencies between preferences and choice.
Similarly, people's ability to evaluate the merit of choices seems
to depend upon the presence of seemingly irrelevant alternatives. To

8 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, in CHOICES VAIUES, AND FRAMES I (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
9
See Paul Slovic, The Construction of Preference, 50 AM. PSYCHOLOGIsT 364, 364 (1995).
10 See Christopher K. Hsee, George F. Loewenstein, Sally Blount & Max H. Bazerman,
Preference Reversals Between Joint and Separate Evaluation of Options: A Review and Theoretical
Analysis, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 576, 578-79 (1999).
See Christopher K. Hsee, The Evaluability Hypothesis: An Explanationfor Preference Re1I
versals Between Joint and Separate Evaluations of Alternatives, 67 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HUMo. DECISION PROCESSES 247, 247-50 (1996).
12
See id. at 249 ("IJ]oint-separate evaluation [preference reversals] occur because one
of the attributes involved in the stimulus options is hard to evaluate independently and the
other attribute is relatively easy to evaluate independently.").
13 See id. at 250-55.
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be consistent, people's preferences should express invariance.' 4 As
one group of scholars put it, "[a] person who prefers chicken over
pasta should not change this preference on learning that fish is also
available." 15 Studies of consumer choice indicate that when people
choose between two products that vary across multiple dimensions,
adding a third option that is clearly inferior to one of the choices
makes that choice much more attractive. For example, in one study,
most subjects choosing between six dollars in cash and a Cross pen
favored the Cross pen; when a third option of an inferior pen was
added, the subjects' preference for the Cross pen over the six dollars
increased. 16 Even though almost no one chose the inferior pen, 1 7 its
availability induced people who would otherwise have preferred the
six dollars to prefer the Cross pen.
The contrast effect can also lead to compromise effects.' 8 When
presented with a choice of three products of increasing quality, people express a preference for the middle category.1 9 The addition of
superior or inferior options shifts preferences in the direction of the
added option.
The most stark demonstrations of the inconsistency that contrast
effects create involve experiments that induce people to pay more for
less of a commodity. 20 In one study, Christopher Hsee had subjects
estimate how much they would be willing to pay for ice cream on a hot
day at the beach. 2 1 Subjects shown a drawing of eight ounces of ice
cream served in a ten-ounce cup reported that they would pay an average of $1.66 for the serving. Subjects shown a drawing of seven
ounces of ice cream served in a five-ounce cup reported that they
would pay an average of $2.26. In other words, people were willing to
pay $0.60 more for less ice cream. When subjects evaluated the
choices together, the preferences reverted to a more rational outcome, with people willing to pay $1.85 for the eight-ounce serving and
$1.56 for the seven-ounce serving.
14

See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and BehavioralScience: Removing the

Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1064 (2000) (identifying invariance as a fundamental assumption of rational choice).
15 Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich & Amos Tversky, Context-Dependencein Legal Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 287, 287 (1996).

I6

See Itarnar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Choice in Context: Tradeoff Contrast and Extreme-

ness Aversion, 29J. MARKETING RES. 281, 287 (1992).

18

Actually, 2 of the 115 subjects chose the inferior pen. See id.
See id. at 290-92.

19

See id.

20

See generally Christopher K. Hsee, Less Is Better: When Low-Value Options Are Valued

17

More Highly than High-Value Options, I1 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 107 (1998) (presenting

several demonstrations of this phenomenon).
21
See id. at 111-14.
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This research demonstrates that people do not measure the value
of commodities with a single, consistent metric. Different contextual
cues can trigger different evaluative processes, even when the cues are
irrelevant. Because these different processes lead to different outcomes, inconsistent choices result. In the ice cream example, people
are not merely evaluating their desire for ice cream, but are also incorporating their sense of whether they are getting good value into their
willingness to pay for the commodity. 22 Similarly, compromise effects
occur because the introduction of more extreme alternatives alters
the metric by which people evaluate the value of commodities.
B.

Consistency in Legal Judgments

The phenomena that psychologists have identified as causing inconsistency in consumer choice have also been documented in legal
contexts. Mark Kelman and his coauthors reported a series of studies
demonstrating contrast effects and compromise effects in legal judgments, 23 including two studies demonstrating compromise effects in
verdict decisions by mockjurors. In one of these studies, subjects read
a description of a crime; some subjects were asked to choose between
a verdict of manslaughter and murder, while others were given verdict
options of manslaughter, murder, and murder with special circumstances. 24 The availability of the third, more extreme option increased the proportion of subjects who chose murder relative to
manslaughter. 25 In effect, the availability of the extreme option
stretched the continuum on which the subjects had to place the defendant's conduct. The subjects' sense of moderation caused them to
shift their evaluations in response to the extreme third option.
In another study of compromise effects by Kelnan and his colleagues, subjects read a description of a homicide and were given four
possible verdict options: murder with special circumstances, murder,
manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter.2 6 Subjects were then
told that judicial rulings had eliminated either the most severe or the
least severe verdict as an option. The elimination of high- or low-severity options affected the proportion of murder verdicts to man27
slaughter verdicts in a way that revealed compromise effects.
Subjects who chose from the "'upper set"' of options (that is, special
circumstances murder, murder, and manslaughter, but not involuntary manslaughter) tended to impose harsher verdicts than subjects
22
23"
"4
25
26
27

See id. at
Kehnan,
See id. at
See id. at
See id. at
See id. at

113.
Rottenstreich & Tversky, supra note 15, at 290-300.
290-92.
291-92.
292-95.
294.
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who chose from the "'lower set"' of options. 28 In this case, subjects
were fully aware of the possible scale, but truncating that scale in one
way or another affected how they applied it to the defendant's
conduct.
Kelman and his coauthors also provided three demonstrations of
contrast effects in legal judgments. 29 They presented results from
three studies that used materials that were structurally analogous to
the study involving the choice between six dollars and a Cross pen.3 0
Subjects basically chose between two settlement or jury verdict options, although half of the subjects were presented with a third, clearly
inferior option. The third option invariably increased the attractiveness of the option to which it was most apparently inferior. 3' Although these studies do not demonstrate the phenomenon in actual
choices, they do reveal that the legal decision-making context does
not, by itself, inspire people to make more consistent choices.
Studies of damage award decisions by mock juries also reveal arbitrariness in how people assess value in the legal system. In cases assessing punitive damage awards, people do not convert their desire to
punish liable defendants into a consistent damage award. 32 Rather,
they seem to use a range of unbounded conversion techniques that
33
are subject to easy manipulation with arbitrary reference points.
Furthermore, conversions of legal judgments into dollar amounts also
suffer from some of the contrast effects identified in studies of con34
sumer goods.
In one demonstration of inconsistent dollar conversions in civil
cases, Cass Sunstein and his coauthors asked subjects to assign punitive damage awards in two cases-one involving personal injury and
the other involving financial fraud. 35 Subjects awarded larger damage
awards in the personal injury cases when they evaluated the personal
injury and financial fraud cases in tandem, than when they evaluated
those cases separately from the fraud cases. 36 This study is closely
analogous to Hsee's ice-cream study. 37 The fraud case in the Sunstein
study involved a particularly egregious case of fraud. In determining
damage awards, subjects likely made mental comparisons between this
28

See id.

See id. at 295-300.
See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
See Kelman, Rottenstreich & Tversky, supra note 15, at 296-300.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages
(with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2103, 2105-07 (1998).
33
See id. at 2142-44.
34
See Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade & lana Ritov, Predictably
29
30
31
32

IncoherentJudgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153 (2002).

35
36
37

See id. at 1173-74.
See id. at 1175-78.
See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
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case and typical, less egregious cases of fraud, driving them to want to
punish this conduct more severely. Subjects may have felt that this
financial fraud case was worse than their general conception of fraud
cases, just as Hsee's subjects may have seen seven ounces of ice cream
as a surprisingly generous portion for a five-ounce cup. In contrast,
the personal injury was probably less egregious than the subjects expected in a personal injury case, just as Hsee's subjects saw less ice
cream than they expected in the ten-ounce cup. When viewed together, however, subjects were reminded that personal injuries really
are much worse than financial losses (just as more ice cream is worth
more money); thus, they awarded more to the personal injury cases.
Once again, these laboratory demonstrations cannot prove conclusively that the same phenomena affect real legaljudgments. In the
case of damage awards, however, studies of decisions by judges and
juries support the proposition that these phenomena do influence
real judgments. Analysis of judgments made by actual judges and juries reveals the kind of pattern Sunstein and his colleagues' laboratory
work predicts.-" Even the unusual hypothesis suggested by Sunstein
and his colleagues' contrast-effect study finds empirical support in
real decisions. 3 9 Their study suggests that experience should produce
more consistency in assignment of damage awards because experienced decision makers are more comparable to subjects who have
seen the two cases together. An experienced decision maker should
not produce an excessive award for an extreme case involving a not-soegregious type of conduct because the experienced decision maker is
well aware of other, more serious, categories of conduct. In the legal
system, this suggests that judges should be less erratic in awarding
damages than juries. In particular, judges should tend to award more
money than juries in personal injury cases, and less money than juries
in financial fraud cases. Studies of actual awards suggest exactly this
40
pattern.
C.

Cognitive Consistency and Punishment in the Criminal
Context

Although the implications of cognitive consistency for the system
of civil liability are important, their implications in the context of the
38
See generally Theodore Eisenberg, John Goerdt, Brian Ostrom, David Rottman &
Martin T. Wells, The Predictabilityof Punitive Damages,26J. LEGAL STUD. 623 (1997) (demonstrating that, like subjects in the experiment by Sunstein and his colleagues, real jurors
produce damage awards that are highly skewed, but correlated with the degree of harm
caused).
39 See Theodore Eisenberg, JeffreyJ. Rachlinski & Maitin T. Wells, Reconciling Experimental Incoherence with Real-World Coherence in Punitive Damages, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1239,
1252-56 (2002).
40
See id.
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criminal justice system are even more serious. Criminal sentences are
unjust to the extent that they are influenced by the kinds of cognitive
incoherence that have been documented in the context of consumer
choice and legal decision making. The studies Kelman and his colleagues conducted on compromise effects in mock criminal verdicts
4
are among the more troubling examples of this inconsistency. '
Whatever harm consumers suffer when buying a stereo because of manipulative presentation of contrasting alternatives, the harm suffered
by a criminal defendant when a jury is manipulated into delivering a
more severe verdict is much more serious.
A conceptual extension of the recent work discussed above
reveals how this inconsistency can arise in criminal cases. Sunstein
and his coauthors demonstrated that inexperienced decision makers
will tend to lose sight of the severity of the type of crime when the
particular crime at issue is an extreme example of its type. 4 2 Consequently, decision makers will punish more harshly than is sensible
those types of crimes that are not so severe when the particular crime
is among the worst of its type. They will also tend to underpunish
crimes that are less severe instantiations of more serious crimes. To
be sure, the criminal justice system does not usually rely on lay persons to assign punishment. Judges perform most criminal sentencing.
In cases involving the death penalty, however, lay persons do have a
role. Although the interjection of the jury into the capital sentencing
process is meant as an extra-procedural safeguard, it might actually
interject inconsistency at the very point in the criminal justice system
when consistency is most crucial. If the psychological phenomena
identified in consumer-choice research hold true for decisions in capital cases, the death penalty may be hopelessly arbitrary.
Cognitive inconsistency can arise in capital cases in several ways.
First, jurors might suffer from contrast or compromise effects due to
widely publicized capital cases in the media. Jurors might find it hard
to resist comparing a defendant's conduct with that of defendants in
other, well-publicized homicide cases. A recent, well-publicized, and
extremely heinous crime might "stretch the scale" by which jurors
measure homicide, thereby raising the threshold of heinousness necessary to impose a death sentence. Well-publicized homicides that jurors perceive as involving conduct less heinous than that of the
defendant in a given case might have the opposite effect. Simply
stated, recent public memory might create contrast or compromise
effects in jurors. Inasmuch as the public memory can be short, and
recent publicity for other murders are well beyond a defendant's control, such effects would create an arbitrariness in capital cases that
41

See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.

42

See Sunstein, Kahneman, Schkade & Ritov, supra note 34, at 1175-76,
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would be hard to avoid. Similarly, the fate of a co-conspirator might
also create the kinds of contrast or compromise effects that create
arbitrariness.
To determine whether these kinds of cognitive inconsistency in
judgment can influence assessments in capital cases, we conducted a
"mock juror" study on a sample of undergraduate students. Our basic
hypotheses were that contrast and compromise effects would affect
punishment decisions. As an initial matter, we used a noncapital case
to ascertain whether the kinds of contrast effects seen in the consumer-choice literature and in punitive damages assessments would be
present in criminal sentencing by lay persons. In this study, we sought
to replicate the findings of Sunstein and his coauthors in the context
of jury determinations on years of imprisonment. We then sought to
extend the research to capital cases using three different sets of
materials.
II
METHODS

Our research methodology followed the logic of much of the research on judgment and choice. We created short, relatively simple
descriptions of a number of crimes and a series of questions about the
appropriate punishment for these crimes. Our methods were akin to
asking subjects to read a description of a consumer product and make
judgments about that product.
Studies like this have obvious limitations. We provided subjects
with only brief descriptive materials-far short of the extensive information available to capital jurors. Undergraduates also differ demographically from a jury-eligible population (although the
undergraduates were, for the most part, eligible to serve on juries).
We also report the judgments of jurors, not juries, insofar as we did
not allow for group deliberation. Most importantly, the subjects in
our study knew full well that they were not actually deciding whether
to sentence a real human being to death. Despite these limitations,
we nevertheless feel that this simple demonstration of the potential
role of cognitive inconsistency in capital decision making is of value.
Although there are numerous empirical studies of the death penalty,
using both real juries and mock juries, we are not aware of any other
effort to relate the psychological research on cognitive inconsistency
in judgment to decision making in capital cases. Thus, this study may
be best viewed as a first step in assessing whether contrast effects influence sentencing decisions in capital cases.
Our subjects consisted of 277 undergraduate students enrolled in
a psychology course at the University of Oregon. The subjects participated in the study as partial fulfillment of course requirements.

2003]

THE COGNITIVE COMPONENTS OFPUNISHMENT

467

The materials consisted of a seven-page survey. It included four
target survey items (one on each page, except for the first item, which
was two pages long), a page containing questions about attitudes toward the death penalty, and a final page that asked for demographic
information. 4 3 The order of these materials did not vary by subject.
In all cases, the first page began with the label "Sentencing Decisions";
no further instructions were given other than what is included in the
descriptions below. All subjects read and responded to the materials
during a class session.
We present the materials and results in the order that follows the
logic of our hypotheses, rather than the order in which the subjects
reviewed the materials (although we note the actual presentation order as well). In all cases, the materials presented the subjects with one
of three different versions: a control condition intended to elicit baseline preferences and two conditions intended to test for contrast effects that would push the choice in opposite directions. The first
survey item tested for contrast effects in quantitative criminal
sentences and the other three tested for contrast effects in the binary
decision of life or death in a capital case. These three studies tested
for contrast effects arising from three different sources: (1) a co-conspirator's sentence; (2) a similar type of crime; or (3) a crime differing in severity. In the latter two cases, in addition to the binary
decision, we also evaluated the subjects' assessments of the propriety
of the death penalty for the defendants described in the materials.
A. Contrast Effects on Years of Imprisonment
The third item in our materials was our extension of Sunstein
and his coauthors' findings on punitive damages to jury determinations of years of imprisonment. Our goal was to demonstrate that the
kinds of contrast effects observed in consumer choice and other legal
contexts extend to criminal sentencing. The logic of this study mimicked that of Sunstein and his coauthors on punitive damage awards
and of Hsee's work on preference reversals: We presented subjects
either with an outrageous exemplar of a generally less harmful type of
crime or with a somewhat benign exemplar of a generally more harmful type of crime, or with both. Our theory was that when evaluated
separately, the more outrageous crime would draw substantially more
punishment than the somewhat benign crime. When asked to evaluate both crimes together, however, subjects would be reminded that
the somewhat benign crime was still the type of crime that is generally
more severe than the more outrageous crime.
43
Although information about the subjects' gender was collected, a data-entry error
prevented the information from being properly recorded. Thus, gender data are not discussed as part of this analysis.
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Because sentencing was the target in this case, we asked subjects
to assume the role of a judge. Specifically, we instructed them to
"[s] uppose that you are sitting asJUDGE in the following case [or two
cases]. Please review the facts and answer the question which follows."
The materials then presented either one of the two crimes or both.
The outrageous exemplar of a less serious crime was a fraud. The
description read as follows:
Q is a 22-year-old male convicted of defrauding an elderly widow
with a phony home-repair business. Testimony indicated that Q
convinced his victim that her home was in desperate need of added
insulation (even though it was in nearly perfect shape). He convinced her that the federal government had adopted a new program
to assist senior citizens in insulating their homes as a way of reducing energy consumption in the Pacific Northwest. He promised her
that he would take care of the program application, which would
reimburse her for all expenses. He then had her take out a mortgage on her home to finance "up-front costs" of the expensive project and he subsequently had her withdraw all of her savings to
finance the rest of this project. Rather than do any repairs, he spent
the money on a lavish vacation and a sports car (which he subsequently destroyed in an episode of reckless driving before he acquired insurance on it). He was then arrested for defrauding the
elderly woman. Unfortunately, she has been able [sic] to make payments on their [sic] mortgage and the bank is threatening to foreclose on her home. The stress also caused her to experience severe
heart problems, which required hospitalization.
The benign exemplar of a more serious crime was an armed rob-

bery. The description read as follows:
P is a 22-year old male convicted of armed robbery of a convenience
store in his neighborhood. Testimony and a surveillance video indicated that P walked in, handed a note to the clerk which demanded
money, and opened his coat to show the clerk a handgun. The
clerk handed him money from the cash register and triggered a silent alarm. Police apprehended P while he was running away. P's
gun was not loaded.
In both cases, the materials informed the subject of the sentencing range with the following: "In Oregon, a conviction for [fraud/an
armed robbery] carries a sentence of between 2-15 years. You have
complete discretion to sentence [Q/P] within this range." Subjects
were then asked to sentence the defendant or defendants by filling in
years in prison for
the following: "I would sentence [Q/P] to [fraud/armed robbery] ."

We predicted that when evaluated separately, subjects would be
outraged by such an egregious case of fraud and consequently would
provide sentences at the high end of the available range, but would
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not be so outraged by the armed robber and consequently would provide sentences at the low end of the range. When viewing both scenarios together, however, subjects would recognize that armed robbery
is a generally more serious crime than fraud, and would feel compelled to give a lengthier sentence to the armed robber.
B.

Contrast Effects Arising from a Co-Conspirator's Sentence

The second item in our materials evaluated the influence of contrast effects arising from the fate of a co-conspirator. Our assumption
in this case was that the availability of an inferior sentence alternative
would influence the choice between a sentence of life and death. Subjects in the control condition had two choices, and subjects in the
experimental condition had three choices. The experimental conditions included the two target choices available in the control condition plus one of two alternatives, each designed to be perceived as
inferior to one of the two choices available in the control condition.
The hypothesis was that the availability of an inferior choice would
influence the target choice. In this case, the target choice was
whether a defendant merited a death sentence or life in prison. As
the description below notes, we introduced a co-conspirator to create
inferior sentence alternatives.
In this item subjects were asked to " [s] uppose that you are a criminal prosecutor in a case with the following facts." The materials then
presented the following description of a crime:
A and B have been convicted of committing several murders during
the course of a bank robbery. A is a male, 30 years old, who has
been convicted of numerous felonies, including the armed robbery
of a convenience store. A has been in prison most of his adult life.
B is his younger, 20 year-old brother who has no criminal record
other than a shoplifting incident as a juvenile.
Testimony at trial indicated that A had recently been paroled
and had convinced B to accompany him on an armed robbery. A
had told B that he needed help to do "one last bank job to get me
on my feet, so I can lead an honest life." After B agreed to help
him, A borrowed two semi-automatic handguns and planned the
holdup.
Testimony of the witnesses to the robbery were quite consistent
(and were supported by a surveillance camera of the bank). Both A
and B entered the bank together, but B remained by the door during the robbery. A ordered everyone onto the floor and then demanding [sic] that a cashier fill a garbage bag with money. A
shouted at the cashier, calling her "too slow" and shot her to death.
B apparently shouted to A, saying, "murder was not part of the
plan." A then had the bank manager take the cashier's place. After
the manager filled the bag, A shot him as well and the two prepared
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to leave. As they did, a guard on the floor reached for his gun and
both A and B began firing. B, being inexperienced with weapons,
ended up spraying the ceiling with bullets while A shot the guard
several times. One of the bullets from B's gun ricocheted off of a
light fixture and also hit the guard. Forensic analysis of the bullets
in the guard's body were inconclusive as to which bullet or bullets
caused his death. As they left the bank, the two were apprehended
by nearby police officers, who saw the two fleeing the bank with
guns drawn.
The materials then asked the subject to recommend a sentence
combination that she felt was appropriate. Specifically, the instructions read: "The judge has asked you to recommend an appropriate
sentence for both A and B. The judge is considering the following
[two/three] options. Which is the most appropriate sentence combination? (Please check one):". The materials then listed either two or
three sentence combinations, depending on the condition.
The two target sentence alternatives were designed to assess the
merits of the death penalty for the main perpetrator in the hypothetical. The primary choice was as follows: "death by lethal injection for
A; 25 years in prison with no chance of early parole for B" or "life in
prison without parole for A; 25 years in prison with no chance of early
parole for B." We attempted to create inferior choices by adding a
third alternative meant to affect the basic choice between life and
death for A. In one case, the third option was meant to inspire leniency on A by offering a choice that was too lenient on B: "life in
prison without parole for A; 10 years in prison with no chance of early
parole for B." This choice was intended to be inferior to the "life/25
years" choice by being similar to that choice, but too lenient for B.
The second experimental condition was meant to inspire a harsh sentence for A by offering a choice that was too harsh on B: "death by
lethal injection for A [and] death by lethal injection for B." This
choice was intended to be inferior to the "death/25 years" choice by
being similar to that choice, but too harsh for B.
We predicted that the availability of an inferior alternative would
create a contrast with the most comparable option, thereby increasing
the proportion of subjects who chose that comparable option. The
inclusion of a third, inferior option can also be viewed as creating
compromise effects. The addition of a third, more lenient alternative
extends the range of sentences downward, whereas the addition of a
third, harsher alternative extends the range of sentences upward. As
in the studies by Kelman and his coauthors, we felt that this manipulation would alter the choices made.
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Contrast Effects Arising from a Similar Type of Crime

The first item in our materials evaluated the influence of contrast
effects arising from exposure to a similar, but less egregious, crime.
The study was intended to simulate the consumer-choice contrast
studies closely. In those experiments, the choice between two products was influenced by the introduction of a third product that was
comparable to one of the two primary choices, but inferior on an important dimension. Here, we sought to influence subjects' assessments of the relative merits of two crimes for the death penalty by
introducing a third alternative that clearly presents an inferior profile
for the death penalty. We theorized that the contrast with an inferior
alternative would make the similar crime seem more appropriate for
the death penalty, just as the addition of an inferior consumer choice
affects consumer purchasing decisions.
To test for the hypothesized contrast effect, we asked subjects to
identify the defendant that was most appropriate for a death sentence
from among a group of defendants. The materials asked subjects to
choose between two different types of murders as being most appropriate for the death sentence. One type was a domestic homicide
committed in a grizzly fashion, and the other was a murder-for-hire.
Our goal in writing these two scenarios was to present two crimes that
subjects would perceive as equally appropriate for the death penalty.
All subjects reviewed these two crimes. In the control condition, subjects chose one of these two crimes as more appropriate for the death
penalty. In two experimental conditions, subjects also reviewed one of
two other crimes: either another domestic violence murder or another murder-for-hire. In both cases, however, the additional crime
presented a much weaker case for the death penalty than either of the
two crimes that all subjects reviewed. Thus, subjects in the experimental conditions reviewed a domestic murder and a murder-for-hire that
were similar to each other in terms of merit for the death sentence
plus a third crime that was similar to one of the target crimes in terms
of type of murder, but was inferior in terms of merit for the death
penalty.
At the outset of this item, the materials asked subjects to
"[s] uppose that you are a criminal prosecutor with limited resources.
You are considering whether to seek the death penalty in one of the
following cases. Please read the case summaries and then answer the
questions which follow." The materials presented brief descriptions of
either two defendants (in the control condition) or three defendants
(in the experimental conditions).
The two target crimes consisted of a grizzly domestic homicide
and a murder-for-hire. The text of the target domestic homicide was
as follows:
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W is a 24 year-old male who has been convicted of a murdering [sic]
his live-in girlfriend and the girlfriend's 3-year-old daughter (which
she had from a previous marriage). W had been living with the
victim for two years and they had recently gotten engaged. Testimony at trial from neighbors indicated that W and this victim had
begun fighting; W accused his girlfriend of resuming her relationship with her ex-husband. At trial, W confessed that during one of
their arguments, while W was very drunk, he began beating his girlfriend until she was nearly unconscious. In a rage, he then tied her
up and slit her throat. He then entered the daughter's bedroom
and stabbed the child to death. W had never been convicted of any
other crime. As a double-murderer, W is eligible for the death
penalty.
The text of the target murder-for-hire was as follows:
M is a 24-year old male who has been convicted of murder. At trial,
testimony indicated that M committed the murder of a complete
stranger in exchange for $5,000. The money was paid by the
nephew of the victim, who hoped to gain a large inheritance from
the wealthy victim's estate. The nephew apparently contacted M
through a friend connected with organized crime, who testified at
trial that M regularly commits murder for hire (although the police
have been unable to connect M to any other murders). M has been
convicted of several other crimes, including robbery and possession
of an illegal automatic weapon. As a murder committed in exchange for something of value, M is eligible for the death penalty
in this jurisdiction.
As noted above, all subjects read descriptions of these two crimes.
In one of the two experimental conditions, subjects also read a
description of a second domestic murder designed to present a less
compelling case for the death penalty. The text of this crime was as
follows:
C is a 24 year-old female who has been convicted of murdering her
husband and one of her husband's friends. C had been married to
the victim for several years. Testimony at trial indicated that C was
the victim of domestic abuse by her husband for at least a year. The
victim apparently physically abused her on several occasions, resulting [in] at least one a visit [sic] to a hospital emergency room with a
broken nose. At trial, C confessed that her husband had come
home drunk with a friend of his and he began verbally threatening
her in front of the friend. She left, broke into a neighbor's house,
and stole the neighbor's shotgun. She then returned home and
shot her husband and his friend to death. C never been [sic] convicted of any other crime. As a double-murderer, C is eligible for
the death penalty.
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The other experimental condition included the two target crimes
plus a second murder-for-hire designed to present a less compelling
case for the death penalty. The text of this crime was as follows:
F is a 24-year old male who has been convicted of murder. At trial,
testimony indicated that F committed the murder of a stranger as
part of an initiation ritual for a local gang in his neighborhood.
The leader of this gang convinced F that he shouldjoin their group.
Apparently, murder had not been a normal initiation ritual in this
gang, but the gang leader told F that he needed to kill a rival gang
leader to become a member. F was told that if he successfully committed the murder, the gang would give him jacket [sic] with gang
colors. Testimony also indicated that F has a learning disability and,
as a result, had been unable to hold steady employment. He had
lived life [sic] with his mother, who had been able to keep him out
of trouble before this time. As a murder committed in exchange for
something of value, F is eligible for the death penalty in this
jurisdiction.
The materials then asked the subjects to identify which of the two
or three crimes was most appropriate for the death penalty. Specifically, the materials asked: "As the prosecutor, you are charged to apply
for the death penalty where it is warranted but because of the great
expense in pursuing a death penalty, you can only ask for it in one of
the cases-which case would you ask for the death penalty?" The
materials then listed the two or three letters corresponding to the
criminals in the above crimes, with a blank line in front of each letter
for the subjects to check. The materials also asked subjects to evaluate
the propriety of the death penalty for each of the two or three
criminals on a seven-point scale. The numbers one through seven
were listed below the question, "How appropriate is the death penalty
as a punishment for [the defendant]? (circle one)," with three qualitative descriptions below the numbers: "1 (Very appropriate)," "4
(somewhat appropriate)," and "7 (not at all appropriate)."
We predicted that the addition of a crime that presented a less
compelling case for the death penalty would facilitate a contrast effect
with respect to the similar type of crime, thereby increasing the proportion of subjects who felt that the contrasting target crime was the
most appropriate case for the death penalty.
D.

Contrast Effects Arising from a More or a Less Severe Crime

The fourth (and final) item in our materials evaluated whether
extreme cases create contrast effects. In this item, the goal was to expose subjects to fact patterns that presented either a strong case or a
weak case for the death penalty in order to determine whether evaluation of such extreme cases would affect the evaluation of a case that
presented a close call for the death penalty. We theorized that evalu-
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ating a strong case for the death penalty would have the effect of
"stretching" what subjects perceive as the higher end of the criminal
activity spectrum that might warrant the death penalty. Thus, after
evaluating a strong case, subjects might perceive an intermediate case
for the death penalty as more benign than they otherwise would have.

In contrast, evaluation of a weak case for the death penalty might act
to "compress" subjects' perceptions of the range of criminal activity
that might warrant the death penalty. After evaluating a weak case,
subjects might see an intermediate case as more deserving of the
death penalty.
In this item, subjects were asked: "Suppose that you are sitting as

a JUDGE in the following [case/two cases] and must determine
whether the death penalty is an appropriate punishment." Subjects in
the control condition then evaluated our intermediate case only, the
text of which read as follows:
S is a 24-year-old male who has been convicted of murder, breaking
and entering, and robbery. Testimony at trial, supported by video
from a surveillance camera, revealed that S broke into a jewelry
shop in the early morning hours, in an apparent burglary attempt.
S admitted that he planned the robbery and believed that the store
would be empty. On most days, the store would have been empty,
but on this occasion, the owner happened to be inside conducting
an inventory. As S was putting items into a sack, the storeowner
startled him. S testified that he "shot the owner, in a panic." S then
fled as the storeowner bled to death. S was caught after attempting
to sell the stolen jewelry at a nearby pawn shop a few hours later. S
had been convicted of burglary in the past, but had never been convicted of a violent crime. In Oregon, murder during a robbery is
punishable by death.
The materials then asked the subjects to assess on a seven-point scale

whether the death penalty would be an appropriate punishment for
this defendant. The numbers one through seven were listed below
the question, "How appropriate is the death penalty as a punishment
for [the defendant]? (circle one)," with three qualitative descriptions
below the numbers: "1 (Very appropriate)," "4 (somewhat appropriate)," and "7 (not at all appropriate)." The materials then stated, "I

would sentence [the defendant] to death: (please circle one)," with
the words 'Yes" and "No" listed below.
In the two experimental conditions, subjects also evaluated this
intermediate case for the death penalty, but before doing so they evaluated a fact pattern that presented either a strong or a weak case for
the death penalty. The description of the strong case was as follows:
U is a 25 year-old male who has been convicted for the murder of
two people. Testimony at trial revealed that U was selling cocaine in
his neighborhood. The two victims were a young husband and wife
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who were distributing cocaine for him. U told friends that he believed that the couple were skimming some of the cocaine for themselves and holding back some of the money they made selling "his
cocaine". He told several witnesses that he "needed to teach the
neighborhood a lesson." Witnesses saw him enter the couples' [sic]
apartment with his gun drawn. One person walking past the window actually saw U shoot the wife. Neighbors reported they heard
much screaming from the apartment, and one neighbor called the
police. [The] [p]olice apprehended U on his way out of the apartment. They found the young couple dead in the apartment, covered in blood. Their 5 month-old infant was found in a rear room,
brutally stabbed to death. The husband's ear was cut off and the
coroner's report indicate [sic] that the wife had been raped, in
front of her husband's body before being shot in the head. DNA
evidence revealed that U committed the rape.
The description of the weak case was as follows:
V is a 20-year old male who has been convicted of first degree murder arising from a bar fight. Testimony at trial indicated that V was
drinking heavily at a crowded bar that had a reputation for violence,
in Portland, Oregon. V got into a shouting match with two other
people, apparently over which sporting event to watch on the bar's
television. V was apparently punched and knocked to the ground
by someone and the bartender ordered V to leave. V became very
angry, shouted that he would "get back at them", and then walked
outside. He got into his car, and deliberately drove it straight
through a plate glass window into the bar. In the process, V killed
two people and injured several others. V had been arrested before
for assault, and had some similar incidents as a juvenile.
Following the written descriptions, the materials also presented the
same two questions concerning appropriateness of the death penalty
for these two crimes. Thus, in the experimental conditions, subjects
read either the strong or the weak case, evaluated that case for the
death penalty, and then read and evaluated the intermediate case.
We predicted that evaluation of the strong case would lead fewer
subjects to support the death penalty for the intermediate case as
compared to the control group, and that evaluation of the weak case
would lead more subjects to support the death penalty as compared to
the control group.
E.

Demographic Information

The remaining two pages of the survey asked subjects to provide a
set of demographic information. We requested this information both
to get a sense of the makeup of the subject population and to identify
some demographic variables that might correlate with answers to our
survey items.
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Previous work on the death penalty indicates that some people
assert that they would refuse to impose the death penalty in any
case. 4 4 The legal system itself recognizes that some people refuse to
consider imposing the death penalty and excludes from service on
capital juries those who express such beliefs. 45 Although at least one
study shows that even these people will nevertheless tend to support
the death penalty in some specific cases, they are far less likely to impose the death penalty than people who express a willingness to consider imposing the death penalty. 46 This variable has been the target

of considerable previous research; thus, we sought to identify its influence on our predictions.
To assess attitudes toward the death penalty, we asked two questions (both taken from other researchers' previous work).47 First, we
asked subjects: "Assume that you have been called as [a] juror in a first
degree murder trial in which the death penalty might be imposed.
Which of the following statements best describes your attitude towards
the death penalty: (check one)." Below this question were two statements: "I would never be willing to impose it in any case, no matter
what the evidence was" and "I would consider voting to impose it in at
least some cases." Second, we asked, "Which of the following best describes your attitudes towards the death penalty," below which were
listed four statements: "I strongly favor the death penalty"; "I somewhat favor the death penalty"; "I somewhat oppose the death penalty";
and "I strongly oppose the death penalty." We report our results both
inclusive and exclusive of the set of subjects who claimed that they
48
would never vote to impose the death penalty.

The final page requested more general demographic information. Specifically, we asked subjects the following: 'Your age"; 'Your
gender"; 'Your year in college (Freshman, Sophomore, Junior, Senior, or Postgrad)"; "Have you ever been the victim of a violent
crime?"; "Have you ever been the victim of a property crime (such as
theft)?"; "Have you ever committed a violent crime?"; "Have you ever
44
See generally Craig Haney, On the Selection of CapitalJuries: The Biasing Effects of the
Death Process Qualification, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 21 (1984) (reviewing the issues
presented by the disqualification of potential jurors who refuse to impose the death
penalty).
4', People who claim that they would never vote to impose death can constitutionally
be excluded from service on capital juries. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522
n.21 (1968).
46
See Michele Cox & Sarah Tanford, An Alternative Method of CapitalJury Selection, 13
LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 167, 176-78 (1989).
47
Our questions were adapted from Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Due
Process vs. Crime Control:Death Qualification andJury Attitudes, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHV. 31 app.
at 49-50 (1984).
48 The subjects' attitudes toward the death penalty did not have any effect on our
results over and above their effects on the binary question of whether subjects would ever
vote to impose the death penalty.
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committed a property crime (such as theft)?"; "Is English your first
49
language (native language)?"; and "Are you an American citizen?"
III
RESULTS

A.

Contrast Effects on Years of Imprisonment

Table 1 presents the results from our study of whether contrast
effects influenced subjects' assessments of the appropriate number of
years of imprisonment for noncapital crimes. The results provided
evidence of a contrast effect. The 64 subjects who evaluated only the
fraud scenario provided a mean sentence of 12.27 years, as compared
to a mean sentence of 6.83 years among the 76 subjects who evaluated
the robbery, a difference of 5.44 years. Among the 137 subjects who
evaluated both crimes, the mean sentences were 10.39 years and 7.63
years: a difference of 2.76 years. The gap between the mean sentences
50
narrowed by 2.68 years, which is a statistically significant difference.
TABLE

1

MEAN YEARS IN PRISON BY CONDITION
Condition (number of subjects)

Robbery

Fraud

Separately (76/64)

6.83

12.27

Together (137)

7.63

10.39

B.

Contrast Effects Arising from a Co-Conspirator's Sentence

Our test of the potential contrast effect of a co-conspirator's sentence necessarily described a fact pattern involving two defendants,
but we were primarily interested in the subjects' decisions whether to
sentence the main perpetrator to death or life. The sentence for the
secondary defendant was designed to create contrast effects on the
sentencing determination for the primary defendant. In the control
condition, 53.9% of the 89 subjects chose to sentence the primary defendant to death. When a third sentencing alternative was offered
that included a less severe sentence for the secondary defendant,
53.4% of the 58 subjects who selected one of the two sentencing alternatives available in the control condition selected death for the priNone of these variables affected the analysis.
t(265) = 5.15, p < .001. The test performed compares the difference between the
means in the two separate conditions with the difference between the means in the concurrent condition. Formulas used to make the calculation are available in R. LYMAN O-rr, AN
INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICAL METHODS AND DATA ANALYSIS 261-63 (4th ed. 1993).
Throughout this Article, the term "significant" is used to denote rejection of the null hypothesis at p < .05.
49

50
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mary defendant. In addition, 40.8% of the 98 subjects in this
condition chose the option involving a life sentence for the primary
defendant and a less severe sentence for the secondary defendant.
This percentage did not differ significantly from the percentage in the
control condition. 5 1 When a third sentence alternative was offered
that included a more severe sentence for the secondary defendant,
54.8% of the 84 subjects who selected one of the two sentence alternatives available in the control condition selected death for the primary
defendant. Additionally, 6.7% of the 90 subjects in this condition
chose death for both defendants. This percentage also did not differ
52
significantly from the percentage in the control condition.
Although exclusion of the subjects who claimed that they would
never vote for death increased the overall percentage of subjects who
favored death for the primary defendant, exclusion of these subjects
did not otherwise affect the analysis. Without these subjects, 58.2%
favored death in the control condition, as compared with 57.7% and
66.2% in the two experimental conditions offering weaker and harsher sentences for the co-conspirator, respectively. These percentages
did not differ significantly from the percentage in the control
condition.

C.

53

Contrast Effects Arising from a Similar Type of Crime

Table 2 presents the results from our study of the contrast effects
caused by comparisons to similar crimes.
TABLE

2

RESULTS FROM CONTRAST WITH SIMILAR CRIMES

Condition
(number of subjects)

% Choosing Domestic
Murder as Most
Appropriate

Appropriateness Measure
(higher value indicates
less appropriate)

Control (38)

65.8

Domestic
2.90

For Hire
3.29

Domestic Contrast (127)

73.6*

2.48

3.32

For-Hire Contrast (112)

75.9

2.63

3.06

* excludes 6 subjects who chose the "inferior" domestic contrast as most appropriate.

As Table 2 suggests, the contrast effect did not influence the subjects'
decisions. Of subjects in the control condition, 65.8% chose the domestic murder as most appropriate for the death penalty. Although
this number rose to 73.6% for the subjects who also evaluated a doBy Fisher's
By Fisher's
5-3 By Fisher's
stronger contrasts,
51
52

exact test, p = .54.
exact test, p = .52.
exact test, p = .55 and p = .21 for the comparison with the weaker and
respectively.
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mestic murder designed to present a less compelling profile for the
death penalty, the difference was not significant. 5 4 Similarly, although
the percentage selecting the domestic murder as most appropriate for
the death penalty rose to 75.9% when subjects also evaluated a murder-for-hire designed to present a less compelling profile for the
55
death penalty, the difference was not significant.
The availability of contrasting crimes also had little effect on the
subjects' beliefs that a crime warranted the death penalty. The mean
appropriateness measure in the control condition (2.90) was reduced
(meaning that subjects evaluated the crime as more appropriate for
the death penalty) when a contrasting domestic murder was present
(2.48). It was also reduced, however, by the contrasting murder-forhire. More importantly, the differences between these conditions
were not significant. 56 Similarly, the ratings of the death penalty appropriateness of the murder-for-hire did not differ significantly by
57
condition.
The lack of significant contrast effects cannot be attributed to the
failure of the stimulus materials to offer suitably contrasting crimes.
The ratings of appropriateness confirm that the contrasting crimes
present inferior profiles for the death penalty. Only 6 of the 127 subjects (4.7%) in the domestic contrast condition chose the "inferior"
domestic murder as the most appropriate for the death penalty, and
they rated the murder as more appropriate for the death penalty on
the seven-point scale. 58 None of the subjects stated that the inferior
"for-hire" murder was the most appropriate for the death penalty, and
they also rated the murder as more appropriate for the death penalty
59
on the seven-point scale.
Exclusion of the 48 subjects (17.3% of the 277 total subjects) who
claimed that they would never impose the death penalty had little effect on the analysis. With these subjects excluded, the percentage
who favored the domestic murder in the control condition was 68.8%

(22 of the 32 remaining subjects) as compared with 79.4% in the condition with the contrasting domestic murder (77 of the 103 remaining

subjects, excluding the 6 subjects who chose the contrasting domestic
murder) and 76.6% in the condition with the contrasting murder-for-

hire (72 of the 94 remaining subjects). The difference in percentages
54
55
56

By Fisher's exact test, p = .23.
By Fisher's exact test, p = .16.
F(2, 274) = 0.63, p > .5.

57 F(2, 274) = 0.69, p > .05.
58 The mean difference was 1.28 points, which was significantly different. (10) =
8.00, p < .001.
59 The mean difference was 1.98 points, which was significantly different. 1(125) =
9.45, p < .001.
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across these conditions was not significant. 611 Also, controlling for the

influence of subjects who claimed they would never impose the death
penalty had no effect on the stated degree of appropriateness of the
death penalty for the target murder-for-hire case: the differences in
appropriateness across the three conditions were still not significant. 6 1
Controlling for the influence of these subjects on the target domestic
murder, however, did affect the analysis. 62 In this case, the contrast
with the domestic murder seemed to make subjects perceive the death
penalty as somewhat more appropriate in the domestic contrast
condition.
D.

Contrast Effects Arising from a More or a Less Severe Crime

Table 3 presents the results for our study of the effect of contrasting appropriateness on the death penalty. In the control condition,
25.4% of the subjects chose death. Although only 18.8% of the subjects who first evaluated the strong contrast case for death chose a
63
death sentence in the target case, the difference was not significant.
Furthermore, evaluating the weak case for death also reduced the percentage favoring death (to 21.9%), which also was not a statistically
significant difference. 64 The subjects' mean ratings of appropriateness for the death penalty likewise did not differ significantly by
65
condition.
The subjects' assessments of the appropriateness of the death
penalty also provided the assurance that the contrasting fact patterns
actually presented strong and weak cases for death. Subjects who evaluated both the strong case and the target case assigned significantly
higher ratings to the target case (meaning that they considered it less
appropriate for the death penalty). 66 Also, 72.7% of these subjects
favored the death penalty for the strong case, which was significantly
greater than the 18.8% of the subjects who favored death for the target case. 67 Subjects who evaluated both the weak case and the target
60
Fisher's exact test on control versus contrasting domestic murder: p = .16. Fisher's
exact test on control versus contrasting murder-for-hire: p = .26.
61
For the main effect of condition, F(2, 271) = 0.50, p > .5. For the interaction be-

tween condition and the subjects' willingness to impose death, F(2, 271) = 2.21, p > .10.
Willingness to impose the death penalty had a significant effect. F(1, 271) = 39.72, p <
.001.
62 For the main effect of condition, F(2, 271) - 3.35, p < .05. For the interaction
between condition and the subjects' willingness to impose death, the effect was marginally

significant: F(2, 271) -2.33, p < .10. Willingness to impose the death penalty had a significant effect: F(1, 271) = 63.01, p < .001.
63
By Fisher's exact test, p = .19.
64 By Fisher's exact test, p = .40.
65

F(2, 274) = 1.11, p = .33.

66
67

This difference was significant; t(152) = 15.6, p < .001.
By Fisher's exact test, p < .001.
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3

CONTRAST EFFECTS WITH CRIMES OF VARYING SEVERITY

% Choosing Death

Appropriateness Measure
(higher value indicates
less appropriate)

Control (59)

25.4

3.78

Strong Contrast (154)

18.8

3.91

Weak Contrast (64)

21.9

4.20

Condition
(number of subjects)

case assigned significantly lower ratings to the target case (meaning
that they considered it more appropriate for the death penalty).68
Also, only 9.4% of the subjects in this condition favored the death
penalty for the weak case, which was significantly less than the 21.9%
of those subjects who favored the death penalty for the target case.6 9
Removing the subjects who stated that they would refuse to vote
for the death penalty did not significantly affect this analysis. As to the
binary choice (death or life), 25.4% of the remaining 59 subjects in
the control condition favored death; 21.0% of the remaining 124 subjects in the strong contrast condition favored death; and 26.4% of the
remaining 53 subjects in the weak contrast condition favored death.
These differences were not significant. T1 As to the "appropriateness"
ratings, after removing subjects who stated that they would never vote
for the death penalty, the mean appropriateness ratings were 3.69,
3.68, and 3.93 in the control, strong contrast, and weak contrast con71
ditions, respectively. The differences were also not significant.
Interestingly, among the subjects who claimed that they would
never vote for the death penalty, no one in the control condition and
no one in the weak contrast condition supported the death penalty
for the target case, but 3 of the 30 subjects (10%) in the strong contrast condition supported the death penalty for the target. It is possible that exposure to the strong case for death made these subjects
realize that they would, in fact, vote for the death penalty in some
instances, and then led them to vote for death in a close case, whereas
they would not otherwise have done so. However, 1 of these 3 was 1 of
the 22 who voted against death in the strong case for the death penalty. The sample size is also too small to provide much support for
this theory.

This difference was significant: t(62) = 2.22, p < .03.
By Fisher's exact test, p = .04.
70
By Fisher's exact test, p = .31 in the strong condition and p = .54 in the weak
condition.
71
F (2, 226) = 0.5, p > .5.
68
69
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IV
DISCUSSION

The data obtained in this study do not show evidence of contrast
effects in decision making about the death penalty. None of the three
different means of identifying contrast effects employed in this study
revealed any significant evidence of such effects. Only the materials
that involved a decision about years of imprisonment demonstrated
contrast effects. Death, it seems, is different after all. Decisions about
who deserves execution proved uniquely resilient to contrast effects.
Subjects appeared to have resisted reliance on comparisons and made
judgments that seemed more absolute. These results suggest that the
difficulties in measurement and scaling that cause inconsistency in
other contexts do not affect decisions in capital cases in the same
ways.
The failure to find contrast effects in this study cannot be attributed to the methodology or to a lack of statistical power. We mimicked the methods that produced sizeable contrast effects in other
contexts and had available a sizeable subject population in which to
observe the phenomenon. With the 277 subjects in our study, any one
of our three studies had an 85.5% chance of detecting an effect as
small as the smallest effect in the study of contrast effects in legal judgments by Kelman and his coauthors, which was the closest study to
ours in terms of methodology. 72
Why would juror assessments in capital cases resist contrast effects? Although our materials were designed to identify contrast effects, not to determine why they would fail to occur, we offer some
speculations arising from the nature of contrast effects in other contexts. In other studies, contrast effects seem to occur in unfamiliar
contexts. The undergraduate subjects in the studies by Kelman and
his coauthors were complete novices in assessing appropriate settlement offers and verdicts in homicides. 73 Likewise, the subjects in the
study by Sunstein and his coauthors were unfamiliar with setting puni72 The contrast condition in that study produced a fourteen percentage point shift
with 158 subjects. See Kelman, Rottenstreich & Tversky, supra.note 15, at 297 tbl.3. This is
equivalent to a correlation coefficient of 0.18. SeeJACOB COHEN & PATRICIA COHEN, APPLIED MULTIPLE RIGRESSION/CORRELATION

ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

39 (2d

ed. 1983) (providing an equation for calculating correlation coefficients). If the population correlation coefficient in any of our studies were as large, we would have had an
85.5% chance of detecting a significant effect (at p < .05) with the 277 subjects in any one
of our three studies. See id. at 59-61 (discussing the calculation of statistical power). Assuming that each study represented an independent chance to detect a significant effect,
we had a 99.7% chance of detecting a significant effect in at least one study.
73 See Kelman, Rottenstreich & Tversky, supra note 15, at 289 (describing the subject
population).
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tive damages award amounts. 74 Psychologists have argued that, in
such contexts, people look for comparisons and tradeoffs that make
sense to them; this is Hsee's "evaluability" hypothesis.7 5 People may
not know how many millions of dollars is an appropriate assessment of
a personal injury, but they at least know it should exceed their assessment of a purely financial harm. Even in Hsee's study involving the
pricing of ice cream, although the subjects were generally familiar
with the price of ice cream, they did not have an exact sense of the
appropriate price. 76 Not knowing exactly how much they valued the
ice cream, subjects in the study knew only that an overfilled cup looks
like a good deal and an underfilled cup looks like a rip-off. Lack of
experience with the task leads people to rely on contrasts and make
relative judgments, even though those judgments are intended to be
absolutes.
Although few people have had personal experience with capital
sentencing-and, in all likelihood, none of the subjects in our study
had ever had personal experience-the task is nevertheless incredibly
familiar. Serious crimes regularly generate local news stories and are
the subjects of numerous television shows and movies. Violent crime
is part of popular culture in the United States, and the availability of
the death penalty is often a substantial part of stories involving violent
crime. People make, and are exposed to, many judgments about what
kinds of crimes result in the death penalty and may have well-formed
opinions on the subject. In all likelihood, subjects in our study did
not just compare the fact patterns we provided as contrasts, but also
considered the wealth of contrasting violent crimes from popular culture. Our simple contrasts thus added only a single exemplar to that
wealth of experience, and hence had little impact on subjects' judgments. In effect, a wealth of experience with issues of violent crime
and criminal justice insulated subjects from contrast effects. As to the
death penalty, the intended absolute judgments were, in fact, somewhat absolute, and were not made relative to the other cases we
presented.
Other explanations for the lack of contrast effects are also possible. In the crime-type contrast, the subjects might not have seen the
contrasting crime as sufficiently analogous. The target domestic murder was a violent crime of anger, whereas the contrasting domestic
crime was one in which the murder was essentially the defensive response of a battered spouse. These crimes may not have been sufficiently analogous in the subjects' eyes to create a contrast, inasmuch
74
See Sunstein, Kahneman & Schkade, supra note 32, at 2146 (describing the subject
population).
75 See Hsee, supra note 11, at 249-50.
76 See Hsee, supra note 20, at 111-14.
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as they arose from different motives. Similarly, the target murder-forhire was essentially the work of a paid assassin, whereas the contrast
murder was a crime arising from the misguided behavior of a mentally
handicapped individual. Although both crimes conform to the legal
definition of murder-for-hire, the contrast might have been lost on
the subjects.
Alternative accounts for the lack of a contrast effect in the other
two studies seem less plausible. In the crime-severity contrast study, it
is possible that the target crime did not present a difficult decision for
the subjects. Although we had intended that the case draw approximately a 50% rate of death sentences in the control condition, only
about one-quarter of the subjects favored the death penalty. The fact
pattern might simply have presented too weak a case for death. Kelman and his coauthors observed the weakest contrast effects in the
case in which the control condition presented an option that was favored by three-quarters of the subjects.7 7 Nevertheless, they still ob-

served contrast effects in this condition.7 8 Thus, although more
extreme cases might reduce the contrast effect, they do not seem to
eliminate it altogether. Our target fact pattern presented enough indecision that it should have been able to elicit a contrast effect. In
this study, we believe that the best explanation for the absence of measurable contrast effects is that people are already so aware of other
violent crimes that the contrasting crime presented in the study could
not have shifted their core understanding of the kinds of conduct that
merit a death sentence.
The contrasting co-conspirator study should likewise have been
able to elicit a contrast effect. Arguably, in the condition that
presented an alternative with a less severe sentence for the co-conspirator, so many subjects favored the less severe alternative that a contrast was not feasible. In the studies by Kelman and his coauthors, and
in other previous work, the contrasting alternative was so inferior that
few subjects selected it.79 In our study, however, 40.8% of the subjects
favored the contrasting alternative. 8° Nevertheless, the other 59.2%
of the subjects felt that this option was inferior; thus, the data should
still have demonstrated some contrast effect. Furthermore, the condition in which a more severe sentence was available for the co-conspirator mimicked the pattern found in the contrast studies by Kelman and
his coauthors in that the vast majority of the subjects (94%) chose
between the target alternatives rather than the contrast. And yet this
condition still produced no contrast effects. In this study, it seems as
77
78
79

80

See Kelman, Rottenstreich & Tversky, supra note 15, at 295-97.
See id. at 297.
Id. at 296-300.
See supra Part II1.B.
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if the subjects separated out their preferred sentence for the co-conspirator and for the target defendant; this is exactly what they should
do if they are making consistent, rational choices, and exactly what
the previous choice literature suggests they will not do.
Finally, the present set of studies illustrates that contrast effects
can impact judgments in criminal cases in general. The imprisonment contrast demonstrated exactly the kinds of contrast effects that
have been observed in other contexts.8 1 Consistent with the theory
that inexperience with the relevant subject matter is a necessary condition for contrast effects, subjects in this study likely had no meaningful experience with the decision they were asked to make. Like the
subjects in previous studies by Sunstein and his coauthors, our subjects had no idea how to translate their punitive intent into a quantitative scale. Consequently, when they had two crimes to evaluate, they
compared the two and made relative, rather than absolute, judgments. These results suggest that there is nothing special about crime
in general that makes it immune to contrast effects, but rather that
widespread understanding of violent capital crime makes judgments
in capital cases more resilient to contrast effects than judgments in
many other legal contexts.
This theory, as supported by the data in this study, suggests that
judgments about the death penalty are somewhat stable and not subject to the kinds of arbitrariness psychologists have demonstrated in
other contexts. People seem to have a relatively stable understanding
of what conduct merits the death penalty, which is not easily manipulated. These results are consistent with the findings Theodore Eisenberg and his coauthors presented in this Symposium. 8 2 Eisenberg and
his coauthors worried that the victim's social status might play a role
in creating arbitrary assignment of the death penalty.8 3 Their study of
actual jurors in capital cases, however, finds no evidence of this effect.8 4 People seem to have fairly stable and consistent beliefs about
who deserves the death penalty.
This is not to say that other factors do not create forms of undesirable arbitrariness in capital sentencing. The present study, however, tends to rule out the influence of an otherwise damning source
of arbitrariness in the death penalty. Jurors may be biased, bigoted,
confused, or misled. But this study suggests that they nevertheless can
express a coherent, internally consistent set of underlying beliefs
about who deserves the death penalty.
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See supra Part III.A.

See Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey & Martin T. Wells, Victim Characteristics
and Victim Impact Evidence in South Carolina Capital Cases, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 306 (2003).
See id. at 321.
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